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MEWP anti-subsidy tariffs announced by EU

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Euan Youdale Editor, Access International

29 April 2025

New tariffs have been set on MEWPs imported to the EU from China following an anti-subsidy investigation by the European Commission, while previously imposed anti-dumping duties have been amended.

The Berlaymont building - headquaters of the European Commission (Image: Andrzej via AdobeStock - stock.adobe.com)

The anti-subsidy investigation began in March 2024, following a complaint by industry group Coalition to Restore a Level Playing Field, formed by a consortium of companies based in the EU which also kick-started the anti-dumping case.

These latest tariffs come on the back of the anti-dumping duties imposed in January on manufacturers based in China, which have now been ammended in light of the results of the subsidy investigation to prevent ‘double counting’, or overlapping of duties across the two ivestigations.

Both sets of duties apply to self propelled lifts, including articulated and telescopic booms, scissor lifts and vertical masts, with a maximum working height of 6m or more.

They also apply to pre-assembled or ready-to-assemble sections, including chassis, turrets or turntables, platforms and lifting mechanisms. They exclude individual components when sold separately, and all vehicle mounted aerial lifts.

Subsidy investigation

The anti-subsidy enquiry analysed the potential way the Chinese state can aid manufacturers in exports specifically to the EU. The Commission noted, “businesses in China operate in a specific environment which – unlike the Western economies where market forces represent the dominant organizing principle – features numerous mechanisms that provide the Government of China (GOC) with substantial degree of control over any aspect of the economic activity in the country.

“This tight control prevents economic operators from acting as rational market operators seeking to maximise profits, and in fact forces them to act as an arm of the government in implementing its policies and plans.”

The Commission added, “China’s financial system remains dominated by the banking sector and the state controls the banking sector through ownership, as well as through personal ties.”

The Commission concluded that China-based producers benefited unfairly, to different degrees, from financing through loans and other financial means.

‘Financial benefits’

As part of its investigation the Commission looked into the financial situation of a sample group of OEMs in terms of their liquidity and solvency risks compared to the financial support they have received, including, for example, bonds with an interest rate below the level that should have been expected.

“Only investors having motivations other than a financial return on their investment, such as compliance with the legal obligation to provide financing to companies in encouraged industries, would make such an investment.”

The Commission concluded that exporting producers benefited from preferential financing in the form of credit lines, bank acceptance drafts and bonds; “In view of this, the Commission considered these types of preferential financing a countervailable subsidy.”

Double counting

To avoid double counting, the Commission deducted the full subsidy amount from the dumping margin before applying anti-dumping duties.

The China Chamber of Commerce for Import and Export of Machinery and Electronic Products (CCCME) objected, arguing that duties at injury elimination levels already offset subsidies and that the sampling led to distorted averages.

The Commission rejected these claims, stating its approach avoided double counting and was based on accurate sampling and legal principles. The Construction Machinery Association of Europe (CMAE) claimed not all subsidies were captured in the dumping margin and some duties could be cumulated, but the Commission maintained its approach due to late submission of supporting data.

The highest duties from sampled firms were applied to non-cooperating exporters, and duties for non-sampled but cooperating producers were based on the weighted average of sampled firms.

Definitive duties:

Company	Anti-subsidy ‘Countervailing’ duty	Anti-dumping duty
Hunan Sinoboom Intelligent Equipment	7.3%	42%
Zoomlion Intelligent Access Machinery	11.6%	30.1%
Zhejiang Dingli Machinery	14.2%	6.4%
Oshkosh JLG (Tianjin) Equipment Technology	0%	22.5%
Terex (Changzhou) Machinery	12.1%	22.9%
Other cooperating companies (Annex I)	12.1%	30.1%
Other companies cooperating in the anti-dumping investigation but not in the anti-subsidy investigation (Annex II)	14.2%	30.1%
Other companies non cooperating in anti-dumping investigation but cooperating in the anti-subsidy investigation (Annex III)	12.1%	54.6%
All other companies	14.2%	52.5%

For non-cooperating companies, the Commission applied the highest duty rate from cooperating sampled firms.
For cooperating non-sampled companies, average rates from the sample were used.

Annex I